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Human beings are compelled to live within a lie, but they can be
compelled to do so only because they are in fact capable of living in this
way. Therefore not only does the system alienate humanity, but at the same
time alienated humanity supports this system as its own involuntary masterplan, as a degenerate image of its own degeneration, as a record of
people’s own failure as individuals.1
—Vaćlav Havel
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his celebrated play Largo Desolato, Vaćlav Havel tells the story of
Professor Leopold Nettles.2 The Professor is a reluctant revolutionary, a
sort of dissident living a hollow existence of fear within the cogs of a totalitarian regime. His work, indeed his identity, conflicts with his surroundings
so that normal human interactions become forced and awkward; his
paranoia-go-obsession with what may happen spirals him into intellectual
and personal stagnation. The political oppression in Havel’s Czechoslovakia and that of modern gays and lesbians draws a unique parallel: they
both require assimilation to the normative expectations of a higher authority. The Eastern European proletariat was forced to capitulate to the will of
a government who ostensibly acted on his behalf. Similarly, American gays
and lesbians have long been forced to conceal their identities by altering
their expressive behaviors. That is, to communicate to the world, by their
demeanor, speech, and associations that they too were heterosexual. They,
in a word, “passed.”3
In no context is “passing” more omnipresent than in the military. The
military’s long blanket prohibition on homosexual identity has forced gay
and lesbian soldiers to remain silent with regard to their sexual orientation.4
Forced silence regarding one’s sexuality, however, is effectively a proscription of personhood. The formation of identity, sexual or otherwise, is inherently a communicative process, the prohibition of which attacks the very
essence of one’s sense of personhood. Like Professor Leopold Nettles, gay

1. VAĆLAV HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS (1978), reprinted in VAĆLAV HAVEL,
OPEN LETTERS 144-45 (Paul Wilson ed. & trans., Vintage Books 1992).
2. VAĆLAV HAVEL, LARGO DESOLATO passim (Tom Stoppard trans., Grove Press 1987).
3. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUT CIVIL RIGHTS 69-70 (2006)
[hereinafter YOSHINO]; Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 772, 813 (2002); Kenji
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 500 (1998).
4. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the military’s prohibition on homosexuals from
serving openly in the military).
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and lesbian service members are relegated to an existence of paranoia; an
omnipresent fear of what may happen.5
Prior to 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States permitted the
criminalization of homosexual intercourse.6 However, in the seminal case
of Lawrence v. Texas,7 the Court reversed itself by holding that Americans
could not be prosecuted for same-sex intimacy.8 There has been considerable debate regarding the reach and applicability of Lawrence, including
whether the military’s policy regarding homosexual service members is
constitutional.9
Yet before any definite conclusion is reached regarding Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell, Lawrence must be unpacked in light of the nature of the group it
is meant to protect. Thus, the nature and the development of homosexual
identity must be examined to ascertain the core of the Supreme Court’s
decriminalization of sodomy. Because the formation of identity occurs in a
social context, and is thus communicative, Lawrence implicates the First
Amendment by the nature of the identity it seeks to protect. This article
seeks to demonstrate that the prohibition on disclosing one’s sexual identity
while in the military violates the First Amendment.
Much of the post-Lawrence debate has concentrated on the level of
judicial scrutiny afforded to gays and lesbians.10 As discussed later, this
paradigm has been observed in post-Lawrence challenges to Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell.11 The standard of review fixation created by the majority’s

5. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S.
Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1143-44 (1997) (describing the
burdens of making false affirmations regarding one’s sexual identity).
6. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a Georgia
criminal statute forbidding sodomy); EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS 6
(1999) (noting that gays and lesbians were not afforded “affirmative constitutional protection
against discrimination” under the equal protection jurisprudence of the federal courts); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57
FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1020-47 (2005) (discussing the rhetoric and jurisprudence of “disgust” and
“contagion” in gay rights litigation).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
9. See infra note 192 (noting various studies analyzing the implications of Lawrence).
10. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819
(11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding the Florida prohibition on homosexuals adopting children);
Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1238-39 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (upholding an Alabama
criminal statute prohibiting possession of certain sexual paraphernalia); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1305-07 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class in upholding the Defense of Marriage Act and a Florida statute recognizing
only heterosexual marriages entered into in Florida or elsewhere); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class in a Tenth Amendment claim against the Defense of Marriage Act).
11. See, e.g., Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (W.D. Wash.
2006) (concluding that “Lawrence is based on rational basis review”); Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F.
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articulation and application of due process, and especially Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, does not adequately address the case’s true
holding.12 In fact, the rationale of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion has
deeper implications than the strict confines of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. Yet for potential plaintiffs seeking to aggrieve a wrong
based on their sexual orientation, arguing for heightened equal protection
scrutiny is an uphill battle, particularly since it technically falls under the
rubric of a “rational basis” analysis.13 Thus, new avenues of litigation must
be pursued not only to vindicate plaintiffs who suffer sexual orientationbased discrimination, but also to establish a firm constitutional basis on
which to adjudicate and clarify those rights. The First Amendment may
provide one such avenue.
This article seeks to demonstrate how a First Amendment framework to
gay and lesbian rights is workable in the military context. Part II of this
article will outline the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the military
and the First Amendment. Traditional notions of judicial deference to military policy will be examined in the context to the right of free speech.
Additionally, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell will be examined along with its constitutionality as held in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. Part III will
attempt to construct gay identity and its expression using the policy
sciences framework. Indeed, because both law and sexual identity are
inherently communicative in nature, the prohibition on expressing sexuality
is tantamount to a compelled affirmation of social expectations of sexuality:
heteronormativity. The policy sciences provide a jurisprudential foundation
for the construction of a group deprivation, and are particularly suited to
understanding gay identity because of their focus on law as communication
and group deprivations. Part IV of this article will look at Lawrence and its
implications on the prohibition of homosexuality in the military. Specifically, the First Amendment implications of the Lawrence majority’s treatment of identity will be examined. Furthermore, post-Lawrence challenges
to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell will be surveyed. Finally, Part V of the article
concludes and explains the implications of a First Amendment approach to
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell litigation.

Supp. 2d 385, 395 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that although “the matter is not free from doubt,”
Lawrence did not call for a heightened level of judicial scrutiny); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed.
Cl. 503, 519 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (applying rational basis review in light of Lawrence); United States v.
Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 204-07 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (discussing the applicable standard of review).
12. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.1, IV.B (analyzing Lawrence and its application to Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell).
13. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to
challenges to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.
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II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CLOSET: HOMOSEXUALS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE MILITARY
Any approach to establishing a liberty in the military must account for
two things. A constitutional basis for the liberty must, of course, be ascertained. However, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to the
military must also be considered. Specifically, the federal judiciary has
been deferential in their review of military policies and practices even when
constitutional rights have been burdened. Any challenge to Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell must thus account for the judiciary’s reluctance to interfere with
military policy. The following sections will discuss the judiciary’s deference to military policy, analyze the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence as applied to the military, and provide an outline of the Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell policy.
A. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO MILITARY POLICY
The contemporary jurisprudence of the federal judiciary relating to
military matters has been marked by deference to the policies and practices
of the armed forces, yet this precedence was not established by the Supreme
Court until the later quarter of the twentieth century. For instance, the
Court held in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles14 that military courtsmartial jurisdiction was limited to active members of the armed forces. 15
Justice Black’s reasoning was based on separation of powers; extending
courts-martial jurisdiction to ex-soldiers for conduct done in a time of war
would be an encroachment on the jurisdiction of federal courts granted
under Article III of the Constitution.16 This would be an unnecessary grant
of congressional power to regulate the armed forces.17
The judicial oversight and review of the military continued throughout
the 1970s. For instance, the Supreme Court held that the conviction by a
military court-martial of a serviceman’s civilian wife, who was accused of
murdering her husband while they were stationed overseas, was unconstitutional.18 The Supreme Court rested its rationale on the framers’ belief that
14. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
15. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 23.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”). It is to be noted, however, that the
Supreme Court had recognized that military personnel were “governed by a separate discipline”
that was applicable to civilians in civil courts. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
18. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 41 (1957). The court-martial exercised jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which provides in part that “all persons
serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of
the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (repealed 1956).
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the proper sphere of the military is “subordinate to civil authority,”19 and
that the broad discretionary powers of military commanders restricted itself
to the battlefront.20 The Supreme Court also reached similar conclusions by
subsequently holding that military tribunals have no jurisdiction over
dependents of military personnel,21 nor their overseas civilian employees.22
The high water mark of Article III supervision of the military came in
O’Callahan v. Parker,23 however. At issue was an active duty soldier who
was court-martialed and convicted for the attempted rape of a civilian
woman.24 The Supreme Court reasoned that disciplining soldiers by courtsmartial was “merely incidental” to the primary purpose of the military.25
Nor were military tribunals equipped to provide the same level of due process protections as civilian courts.26 The Supreme Court restricted the jurisdiction of military tribunals to “cases arising in the land or naval forces.”27
After the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court began to
reverse its active review of military policy and procedures by deferring to
the military. This deference was based upon the idea that the armed forces,
as a matter of necessity, constituted a “specialized separate society” distinct
from that in which civilians reside.28 The distinction was evident in
differences between the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and
civilian law, as well as the different cultures of military and civilian life.29

19. Reid, 354 U.S. at 30.
20. Id. at 33.
21. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (holding the
provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice permitting a court-martial to exercise
jurisdiction over a civilian dependent of a service member for a non-capital offense were
unconstitutional in light of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
22. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (holding that
a civilian employee of the armed services could not be convicted by a court-martial); Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 279-80 (1960) (holding that overseas civilian employees were not subject to
the military’s court-martial jurisdiction).
23. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
24. Parker, 395 U.S. at 260.
25. Id. at 262.
26. Id. at 262-63.
27. Id. at 272. The Supreme Court also noted that the military’s jurisdiction over the militia
extended only to “actual service in time of war or public danger.” Id. See Ex parte Mason, 105
U.S. 696, 700-01 (1881) (holding that the “time of war” limitation on the application of the Fifth
Amendment was applicable only to the militia); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 83-84
(1857) (upholding the jurisdiction of a court-martial over a service-member who was acquitted of
a military charge yet convicted of a non-military offense).
28. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 757-58 (1974) (upholding the military conviction for
voicing dissent of American military involvement in Vietnam). See Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (stating that “great deference” should be afforded to the judgments of the Court
of Military Appeals).
29. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 744 (“Just as military society has been a society apart from civilian
society, so ‘[m]ilitary law. . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law
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An early example of the judicial bifurcation of civilian and military
culture occurred in Rostker v. Goldberg.30 At issue was the constitutionality of a Military Selective Service Act provision requiring only males to
register for the draft. In upholding the male-only draft, the Court reasoned
that the constitutional authority vested in Congress to raise and support
armies was “broad and sweeping.”31 The broad powers of Congress to
regulate military and national defense policy consequentially left the Article
III judiciary without competence in adjudicating matters of military
concern.32
The Supreme Court articulated its deference to military necessity and
congressional policy by overturning its O’Callahan precedence in Solorio
v. United States.33 The Supreme Court in Solorio held that the military did
in fact have the power to try service members, regardless of the nature of
the crime, by virtue of their status as United States military personnel.34
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, stated that “judicial
deference. . . is at its apogee” when there is a challenge to legislation
drafted pursuant to congressional authority to raise and support armies.35
The Supreme Court reasoned that the plenary power of Congress to raise
and support the armed forces necessarily contemplated a plenary power to
regulate conduct of soldiers.36

which governs in our federal judicial establishment.’’’ (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140 (1953) (plurality opinion))).
30. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
31. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
32. Id. at 64-65.
33. 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987) (overruling O’Callahan, which held that courts-martial
jurisdiction extended only to cases arising under the armed forces). See supra notes 16-27 and
accompanying text.
34. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436-39.
35. Id. at 447 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508, (1986); Rostker, 453
U.S. at 70).
36. Id. at 441. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, stated:
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the Armed Forces, Art. I, § 8,
cl. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting Congress authority, inter
alia, to regulate commerce among the several States, to coin money, and to declare
war. . . . [T]here is no indication that the grant of power in Clause 14 was any less
plenary than the grants of other authority to Congress in the same section. Whatever
doubts there might be about the extent of Congress’ power under Clause 14 to make rules
for the “Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” that power surely
embraces the authority to regulate the conduct of persons who are actually members of
the Armed Services.
Id.
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B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MILITARY
Judicial deference to military policy has also applied to a significant
extent to cases involving assertions of First Amendment protections. In
1966 Captain Howard Levy, posted as Chief of Dermatological Services at
an army hospital, made several statements protesting American involvement in Vietnam.37 He was subsequently tried and convicted for, inter alia,
violating Articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ sanctioning conduct unbecoming an officer,38 and “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces,” respectively.39 Captain Levy
challenged his conviction on the grounds that the First Amendment required
the UCMJ to be narrowly tailored in Parker v. Levy.40 The Supreme Court
disagreed. The Court stated that the military community, distinct from its
civilian counterpart, necessitated different standards of First Amendment
protection.41 As such, the special requirements of the military constituted a
sufficient countervailing policy to not extend First Amendment protections
in the military context to the same extent as civilian speech jurisprudence.42
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Glines43 reached a similar result. At
issue was an Air Force regulation requiring prior approval for the circulation of petitions on Air Force bases.44 Citing Levy, the Court noted that the
First Amendment protection afforded to military personnel was necessarily
more restricted than the protections applicable to civilians.45 Military
commanders were deemed within their right to prevent the distribution and
circulation of a petition that presented a threat to military readiness.46 As
such, the scope of the protections of the First Amendment did not encompass the circulation of unauthorized petitions on Air Force bases.47
37. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 736-37 (1974).
38. Id. at 736; 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000).
39. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).
40. 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974).
41. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, stated that “[t]he
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside it.” Id.
42. Id. at 760.
43. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
44. Glines, 444 U.S. at 349. See Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(1) (1970) (“No member of the
Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written material other than publications of an
official governmental agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation without
permission of the commander or his designee.”).
45. Glines, 444 U.S. at 354-55.
46. Id. at 353.
47. Id. at 355-56. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (holding that there was no
unqualified First Amendment right to deliver political speeches or to distribute political literature
on military reservations).
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Moreover, in 1986 the Supreme Court upheld an Air Force regulation
restricting the wearing of religious clothing. In Goldman v. Weinberger,48
the Court rejected the claim that the Establishment Clause barred restricting
a service member from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform.49 The Court
stated that judicial deference should be given to military necessity even
when it burdens a constitutional right.50 Because uniforms “encourage a
sense of hierarchical unity” and discipline essential to military preparedness, judicial review of First Amendment claims should give “great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities.” 51 The Court, in
building on both Levy and Glines, refused to apply the level of judicial
scrutiny afforded to civilians regarding a fundamental right.52 Effectively,
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence regarding individual
service members has been the passive, non-articulation of a coherent standard. The judicial identification of a bright-line standard, of when expression deserves protection, ought to be delineated when military policy burdens rights considered most fundamental to personal freedom and identity.
C. THE ARTICLE I KULTURKAMPF: DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL
1.

The Blackletter Prohibition

Homosexuality has long been perceived as incompatible with military
service.53 Prior to 1993, the military imposed a blanket prohibition of
homosexuals from serving, which was routinely upheld by the courts
against due process and equal protection challenges.54 Yet in 1993 the
48. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
49. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.
50. Id. at 507 (stating that the “review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations
designed for civilian society”).
51. Id. at 507-08. See Steven B. Lichtman, The Justices and the Generals: A Critical
Examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Traditional Deference to the Military, 1918-2004, 65
MD. L. REV. 907, 923-24 (2006) (arguing that Weinberger was one of the “most blatant” instances
of judicial deference to the military).
52. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-10.
53. Sir Winston Churchill personified the history of homosexual activity in the armed forces
with his infamous quote that naval tradition was “nothing but rum, sodomy and the lash.” SIR
PETER GRETTON, FORMER NAVAL PERSON: WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE ROYAL NAVY 2
(1968). “Homosexual proclivities” were first codified in the United States as a disqualification for
military service by the Army and Selective Service in 1941. ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT
UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR TWO 121 (1990).
However, the first documented case of separation from the military for alleged homosexuality
occurred in 1778. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY, VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF 11 (1993).
54. DoD Directive No. 1332.14 (1982). See 32 C.F.R. § 41, app. A (1993) (excluding any
soldier “who engages in. . . homosexual acts”). The pre-1993 general prohibition on homosexual
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blanket ban was revisited on the initiation of President Clinton and subsequently altered by Congress to allow gay and lesbian service members to
continue active duty in the military on the condition that their sexual orientation is not disclosed.55 The policy became appropriately known as Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.56
Interestingly, the prohibition on homosexuality in the armed forces
does not constitute a ban in the classical sense. Rather, Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell precludes gay and lesbian soldiers who have disclosed their sexual
identity from serving in the branches of the armed forces. In fact, military
directives have stated that homosexuality is not a per se bar to military
service.57 The policy is effectively a compelled affirmation of heterosexuality; a modern kulturkampf—“a state struggle to assimilate a threatening
minority, or to force conformity upon it.”58 In other words, the policy of
presuming heterosexuality forces gay and lesbian service members to
actively conceal their sexual identity by projecting a façade of
heteronormativity.
The operative rationale of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is that service
members demonstrating “a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military
capability.”59 “Homosexual acts” are defined broadly as including “any
bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.” 60
Moreover, any conduct that serves to “demonstrate a propensity” to engage
in homosexual conduct is also covered by the ban.61 Thus, Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell goes beyond traditional notions of sexual misconduct in the

service members successfully withstood constitutional challenges on equal protection and due
process grounds. Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.
1994); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d. 677, 686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989); Rich v. Sec’y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (10th Cir.
1984).
55. Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 919, 92022 (1994).
56. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571,
107 Stat. 1547 (1993), codified as 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
57. Wolff, supra note 5, at 1144 n.2.
58. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of Coming Out: Religion, Homosexuality, and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2413-14 (1997).
59. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2000).
60. Id. § 654(f)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 654(f)(3)(B).
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armed forces and precludes homosexual intimacy and affection regardless
of the circumstances.62
The disclosure of sexual orientation by a soldier, however, does not
automatically result in separation from the armed forces. Rather, under the
policy it creates a rebuttable presumption that a propensity to engage in
“homosexual conduct” exists.63 However, the mere statement that one is a
homosexual is sufficient to begin administrative separation proceedings.64
The service member in question has the burden of presenting evidence to
rebut the presumption in order to successfully prevent separation from the
armed forces.65 Of course in practice, soldiers are only likely to successfully rebut the presumption if it is believed that they were lying when they
disclosed their homosexuality to a superior officer.66
Commanding officers are vested with broad discretion under the policy
to commence an investigation to ascertain the veracity of a soldier’s sexual
orientation. The procedures outlining such inquisitions state that only the
commanding officer has the authority to initiate an inquiry based on
“credible information.”67 The procedures state that informal fact-finding
methods are preferred, and that the commanding officer has the sole responsibility of determining what information is credible.68 After an officer
determines that such credible information exists, the officer may then ask
the service member whether he or she is a homosexual.69 The enforcement
of the policy and the manner in which an inquiry is conducted is contingent
on the will of individual commanders. This has led to the selective and
inconsistent targeting of suspected gay and lesbian service members.70

62. Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of “Gays in the Military”
Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223, 233 (1996).
63. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2), (b)(1)(E) (2000); DoD Directive 1332.30, encl. 2, § C & C.1.b., at
2-1, 2-2 (Mar. 14, 1997).
64. See DoD Directive 1332.14, encl. 2, § E2.1.7 (Mar. 14, 1997) (defining homosexual
conduct as “[a] homosexual act, a statement by the [s]ervice member that demonstrates a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted
marriage”); DoD Directive 1332.14, encl. 3, attach. 4x, § 4.5 (Mar. 14, 1997) (“A statement by a
[s]ervice member that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual creates a rebuttable presumption that
the [s]ervice member engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual acts.”).
65. Id. at encl. 3, attach. 1, § 1.8.1.2.2.
66. See, e.g., Hensala v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 343 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting
that the commanding officer recommended that the service member under investigation not be
separated because the purpose of disclosing his homosexuality was to avoid active duty).
67. DoD Directive 1332.14, encl. 3, attach. 4, § 1.1 (Dec. 21, 1993).
68. Id. at encl. 3, attach. 4, § 1.3 (Dec. 21, 1993).
69. Id.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing individual cases of separation pursuant to the
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy).
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Constitutionality: Manifestations of Judicial Deference

Military readiness and necessity have proven insurmountable to plaintiffs asserting that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is constitutionally incompatible
with the First Amendment. Early attacks of the policy met with the judicial
adherence to the precedence of granting deference to military policy even
when a fundamental right is burdened.71 The uniqueness of the mission of
the armed forces and the necessity to maintain readiness, unit cohesion, and
general morale constituted a government interest greater than the burden
that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell places on the First Amendment.72
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in Thomasson v. Perry.73 Lieutenant Paul
Thomasson was discharged from the Navy, despite having an exemplary
service record, after he made known his sexual orientation, in disagreement
with the policy, to four admirals under which he served.74 A Board of
Inquiry convened to conduct separation proceedings and found that
Lieutenant Thomasson failed to rebut the presumption that he had a propensity to engage in homosexual acts.75 An appeal was subsequently filed and
alleged, inter alia, that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was an unconstitutional
burden on his First Amendment right to free speech.76
Much of the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning was grounded in the federal
judiciary’s relatively nouveau deference to military policy. The opinion
stated that “military life is fundamentally different from civilian life.”77
Moreover, the court held that the First Amendment challenge by Lieutenant
Thomasson could not be separated from “the special legal status of military

71. See Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 263-65 (D. Md. 1995) (stating that First
Amendment claims involving the armed forces must be analyzed in light of Congress’ “plenary
control” over the military). Recall that this was the same rationale of the Supreme Court in
Rostker v. Goldberg in holding that judicial scrutiny of military matters was more deferential than
in the civilian context. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. The Selland Court reached
the same conclusion by holding that the “professional judgment” of military commanders
necessitated judicial deference. Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 264. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
692 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, Parker v. Levy, and Brown v.
Glines in concluding that “even the First Amendment must yield at times to the exigencies of
military life”).
72. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 692; Stelland, 905 F. Supp at 265.
73. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
74. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920. Lieutenant Thomasson received the highest possible
performance ratings and was selected to participate in the highly selective Joint Chiefs of Staff
Internship. Id. Moreover, in an evaluation of Lieutenant Thomasson, Rear Admiral Lee F. Gunn
stated that he was “a true ‘front runner’ who should be groomed for the most senior leadership in
tomorrow’s Navy.” Id.
75. Id. at 920-21.
76. Id. at 922.
77. Id. at 920 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(8) (2000)).
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life.”78 As such, the circuit court upheld Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell on First
Amendment grounds.79 The court in Thomasson acted in congruence with
the federal judiciary by conceptualizing the military as a de facto “pocket
republic” within the federal system.80 The belief that the military culture is
so distinct from that in which civilians live has manifested itself as a
general reluctance to interfere in the processes of the armed forces. It is
because of this reluctance that gay rights litigation in the military context
has been so unsuccessful.81
Notwithstanding its declaration that the First Amendment must be
construed in light of the military’s distinctiveness, the court held that Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell does not target the spoken words of proclaiming one’s
homosexuality.82 Rather, the spoken words “I am gay” serves an evidentiary purpose in demonstrating propensity to engage in homosexual conduct.83 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is not considered a content-based restriction
on speech because it does not suppress any viewpoint of homosexuality.84
The Department of Defense Directives relating to homosexuality in the
military permit such activities as attending gay parades and reading gay
literature.85 Accordingly, there is no valid constitutional issue raised by the
policy because the First Amendment, according to the Fourth Circuit, is not
implicated because it does not prohibit speech. Rather, declarations of
homosexuality serve only as evidence “to prove motive or intent.”86
Subsequent decisions upholding Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell against First

78. Id. at 924. The court cited the traditional notion that “success in combat requires military
units that are characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion” in
justifying the military necessity to preclude open homosexuals from serving in the military. Id. at
920.
79. Id. at 931-32.
80. See Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 31-54 (2002)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has acknowledged a distinct military culture and deferred to
military policy in furtherance of this distinction).
81. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
128-29 (1999).
82. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 932 (stating that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell “aims at . . . propensity, not at speech, it
is not a viewpoint-based or content-based regulation”).
85. See DoD Directive 1332.14, encl. 4, § E(4) (stating that credible information does not
exist when “the only information known is an associational activity such as going to a gay bar,
possessing or reading homosexual publications, [or] associating with known homosexuals”); DoD
Directive 1332.30, encl. 8, § C.3.d., at 8-2 (stating that associational activities alone are an
insufficient basis for separation); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 932 (holding that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
is “not a viewpoint-based or content-based regulation”).
86. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931 (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)).
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Amendment challenges utilize similar reasoning as the Fourth Circuit in
Thomasson.87
III. EXPRESSIVE HOMOSEXUALITY
Professor Kenji Yoshino recently articulated a juridical philosophy
regarding the expression of an individual’s identity: so long as there is a
right to be a particular type of person, there is a corresponding right to
express it.88 Of course the history of the military’s policy regarding the
status of homosexuals within its cadres does not support this proposition.
Yet when one accounts for the construction of a “gay identity” and the
expressive speech jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it becomes more of
a challenge to find that the First Amendment lacks protection for “coming
out” in any context.
A. GAY IDENTITY
Any understanding of a group-based deprivation necessarily begins
with a construction of the group’s identity.89 A person’s identity is based
on their individual beliefs, feelings, and emotions vis-à-vis social ascriptive
norms.90 This identity, however, can only be conceptualized in terms of
interpersonal communication, expression, and interaction. A basic human
need, affection, can be understood as a construction vis-à-vis another
person.91 Personal identification of oneself as heterosexual or homosexual
lays in the affection toward another person in social context. Such affection
necessarily entails a corresponding expression of love, which goes beyond
mere words spoken in private. Affection rather manifests itself in the
general expression inherent in the discourse of a relationship. The

87. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. California Army
Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429-30
(9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261-64 (8th Cir. 1996).
88. YOSHINO, supra note 3, at 70.
89. See Winston P. Nagan & Vivile F. Rodin, Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder:
Towards A Legal Theory About Group Deprivations, 17 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 133, 139-46 (2004)
(articulating a comprehensive theory on the jurisprudential and anthropomorphic foundations of
group identity formation, and the dynamics of group domination and subjugation).
90. Id. at 144.
91. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). In Roberts, the Court stated
that constitutional protections afforded to relationships “[reflect] the realization that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.” Id. The Court also stated
that the “ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”
Id. Justice Blackmun came to a similar conclusion in his dissent in Bowers. Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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communication of love is not only directed at the object of one’s desire but
to third parties—the world at large.92
Indeed, sexual identity is inextricably linked to one’s sense of self or
personhood.93 The act of self-definition is one fundamental to human
existence that is inviolable against the state,94 a right to “metaprivacy”
regarding one’s human identity.95 A corresponding prohibition on state
action that restricts personal identity is the expression of such identity.96
Sexual identity only becomes genuine in a Foucaultian sense when it is
transmitted externally.97
An individual thus not only identifies as gay or straight with respect to
internal feelings of affection towards another, but also through the public
manifestation of affection towards another of either the same or opposite
gender. Identity in a sense vests when that identity is transmitted or expressed towards third persons. The expression of affection towards others
92. See Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2006) (arguing that homosexual identity is linked to relationships in
certain social groups); Tom Boellstorff, The Perfect Path: Gay Men, Marriage, Indonesia, 5 GAY
& LESBIAN Q. 475, 496 (1999) (asserting sexuality only becomes genuine identity when a third
party “interprets and acknowledges [the] confession”).
93. Lau, supra note 92, at 1282-83; Terry S. Stein, Overview of New Development in
Understanding Homosexuality, 12 REV. PSYCHIATRY 9, 20-23 (1993); John C. Gonsiorek &
James R. Rudolph, Homosexual Identity: Coming Out and Other Developmental Events, in
HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 161, 163 (John C. Gonsiorek &
James D. Weinrich eds., 1991); Rachel Franke & Mark R. Leary, Disclosure of Sexual Orientation
by Lesbians and Gay Men: A Comparison of Private and Public Processes, 10 J. SOC. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 262, 263-69 (1991); HAROLD LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLANA, POWER AND
SOCIETY 10-13 (1950). Lasswell and Kaplan, in discussing the process of group identity, stated
that:
An ego is an actor using symbols. . . . Identification is the process by which a symbol
user symbolizes his ego as a member of some aggregate or group of egos. . . .
Symbolizing distinguishes the process but does not exhaustively characterize it: other
acts, externalized as well as internalized, occur in conformity with the symbolic
relationship. . . . The self is the ego and whatever it identifies with that ego. The
concept is close to what William James designated as the “social self”: A man ‘has
many different social selves as there [are] distinct groups of persons about whose
opinions he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these
different groups.’ The self as here defined is the set of these ‘different sides’ in their
inter-relatedness. It thus compromises all the roles which the ego adopts, and is
characterized by specifying the individuals and groups with which the ego identifies.
Id. (emphasis and internal citations omitted).
94. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 753 (1989).
95. Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862,
1867 (2006); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Lawrence stated: “Liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
96. ESKRIDGE, supra note 81, at 123.
97. Boellstorff, supra note 92, at 496. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY 61-63 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (arguing that communication regarding sexual
identity is essentially expression occurring in the context of a power relationship which defines
and reconstructs the identity).
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outside of the relationship is a proclamation of the relationship and indeed
the sexual identity of the parties to society. It is also the search and request
of social acceptance and recognition of the relationship. A state’s recognition of a heterosexual marriage performs the same function; it is the
embodiment of society’s acknowledgment and approval of a unit of
affection. The corollary to that recognition of a system of affection is social
approval and acceptance of the identities of the parties. Namely, to
formalize a heterosexual relationship by obtaining the state’s recognition of
the relationship—i.e., marriage—is to obtain social acceptance of the parties’ heterosexuality.98 Because of the inherent communicative function of
self identity and affection, a court cannot restrict the expressive attributes of
personhood; expression of identity and the identity itself are inseparable.99
Indeed, this concept is found throughout cultures and various jurisprudential systems. For instance, the African concept of ubuntu—the principle
that individual worth is expressed or manifested through their relationships
with others—demonstrates this clearly.100 Archbishop Desmond Tutu
famously stated that:
A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of
others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for
he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing
that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when
others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or
oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.101
The focus on human inter-connectedness relationships has also been
influential in South African case law.102

98. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 160-61 (1990)
(“[M]ost gay and lesbian liberation advocates seek not merely civil rights, but the affirmation of
gay men and lesbians as social groups with specific experiences and perspectives.”).
99. See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319,
325-27 (1994) (discussing the First Amendment implications on sexual expression).
100. For a background of the ubuntu philosophy see generally LOVEMORE MBIGI & JENNY
MAREE, UBUNTU: THE SPIRIT OF AFRICAN TRANSFORMATION MANAGEMENT passim (1995);
Mogobe B. Ramose, The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a Philosophy, in The African
Philosophy Reader 230 (P.H. Coetzee & A.P.J. Roux eds., 2d ed. 2003); Winston P. Nagan &
Craig Hammer, Communications Theory and World Public Order: The Anthropomorphic, Jurisprudential Foundations of International Human Rights, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 754-55 (2007).
101. DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 31 (1999).
102. See, e.g., S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 484A (S. Afr.); City of
Johannesburg v. Rand Properties (Pty.) Ltd. and Others, 2006 (1) SA 78 (W) at 63 (S. Afr.)
(“[T]he culture of ubuntu is the capacity to express compassion, justice, reciprocity, dignity [sic]
harmony and humanity in the interests of building, maintaining and strengthening the community.
Ubuntu speaks to our inter-connectedness, our common humanity and the responsibility to each
that flows from our connection.”).
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Yet when we begin to discuss humanist philosophy and human development as a function of relationships, the individualist paradigm of rights
begins to erode. When there is judicial protection of an individual’s identity
to the extent that identity is based on group affiliation and interpersonal
relationships, then protection by logic must also extend to the group
itself.103 This is because identity, a sense of self, is so integrally linked to
group identification and relationships. Of course, sexual identity is no exception to this. To identify as a gay, lesbian, or bisexual person, an
individual must at some point develop intimate feelings towards others of
the same gender. Moreover, as the individual develops, he or she also
affiliates with and befriends individuals in society who have similar
attitudes and share his or her sexual preference.
The policy sciences provide a useful jurisprudential foundation to analyze group-based deprivation. Developed by Professors Myres McDougal,
Harold Lasswell, and Michael Reismann, the policy sciences demarcate
how power operates in society and within nations.104 The policy sciences
view the state as a continuum in which individual and political entities are
interconnected through communication.105 This takes place within the

103. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 76 (1995). There is a rich academic debate regarding individualist and collectivist rights
paradigms. Id. Will Kymlicka, for instance, has argued that “societal culture” is one that
“provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities,
including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public
and private spheres.” Id. As such the goal of protecting individual rights can only be reached
with group based protections. Id. at 26-35. See Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and
Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, 29 WORLD POL. 343, 343 (1977) (stating that an
“individualist conception [of rights]—is unduly limited . . . [c]onsidering the heterogeneity of
mankind . . . it is also necessary to think of ethnic communities and certain other kinds of groups,
and to include them among the kinds of right-and-duty-bearing units whose inter-relationships are
to be explored”); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1219, 1246 (1991) (noting that individual identity does not
form in an asocial vacuum). For a discussion of early conceptualizations of group rights see C.A.
MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 157-59 (1934).
Although the focus is on cultural liberties, a group rights paradigm is also conducive to
sexual minorities. One commentator noted that:
If a group enjoys a distinct mode of life and if that mode of life takes a collective
form, perhaps our moral recognition of that mode of life has to be directed towards the
group collectively rather than to its members severally. . . . [S]ome of that is
fundamentally important for people to relate to identities that they can possess and to
practices in which they can engage only in association with others. Consequently, it
can seem merely arbitrary to insist that people can have rights only to goods that they
can enjoy only collectively.
Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 353 (1999).
104. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, passim (1959) (discussing the relationship
between law and power).
105. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 240–67 (1930)
(describing the “state as a manifold of events”). The policy sciences look to signs and symbols to
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confines of social process, defined by the policy sciences as human beings
pursuing values through institutions based on resources.106 Of course
various “values” or ends are pursued based on the individual’s subjectivities. These can be wealth, power, rectitude, and affection.107 As individuals with like preferences such as sexual orientation pursue affection,
group associations form across borders without regard to legal jurisdictions.
This is why a gay man in Los Angeles, for instance, shares a commonality
with a gay man in London even though the men are subject to different
sovereigns, social dynamics, and domestic laws.
A problem that one must confront is group “dominance” and group
“subjugation.”108 As groups begin to form and constitute their preferences
through law, groups representing a majority preference may attempt to
dominate or exclude the preference of minority groups. To begin to understand such a group deprivation requires one to begin with the construction
of the identity of both the majority and minority groups.109 A past example
illuminates how the formation of a minority group’s identity, and the
instillation of a majoritarian perception of “otherness” toward that group,
can lead to its subjugation. The first gay rights law was not enacted until
1972 when East Lansing, Michigan included a sexual orientation clause in a
local ordinance.110 Predictably, as various jurisdictions began to protect
demarcate the meaning of interaction between persons. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL & JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER xii (1967) (theorizing that “[s]igns are materials or energies that are specialized to the task
of mediating between the subjective events of two or more persons”).
106. Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World
Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, 809-10 (1988). It is notable
that the “perception of interdependence” within the social process “leads participants to appreciate
the relevance of pursuing common interests and motivate them to clarify it.” Id. at 810. For an
orientation of the social process see generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND
PERSONAL INSECURITY 149–50 (1935).
107. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 268-75 (1966–67). See
MYRES MCDOUGAL & HAROLD LASSWELL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: LAW
SCIENCE AND POLICY 375-507 (1992) (discussing the various base values pursued in the social
process).
108. See MYRES MCDOUGAL, HAROLD LASSWELL, & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521-60 (1980) (outlining the dynamics of group domination and
subjugation). It is notable that the anthropomorphic, jurisprudential foundation of group deprivation is applicable in a variety of contexts. Winston P. Nagan has, for example, applied this model
to group-based deprivations along racial and ethnic parameters in examining the roots of the South
African Apartheid system as well as instances of genocide. Nagan & Rodin, supra note 89, at
139-44. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 1 (1982) (viewing slavery as a
system “structured and defined by the relative power of the interacting persons”).
109. See Nagan & Rodin, supra note 89, at 139-40 (discussing the process of identifying
markers in the context of constructing group identity).
110. See Peter M. Cicchino, Bruce R. Deming & Katherine M. Nicholson, Sex, Lies, and
Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 549, 563-99 (1991) (discussing the legislative obstacles facing gay rights proponents).
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homosexuals, a multitude of anti-gay organizations began to coalesce
against legislating gay liberty. One such infamous example was Anita
Bryant’s 1977 “Save Our Children” campaign in Florida. Despite the campaign’s aim of repealing a Miami housing ordinance prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals, its rhetoric served to construct a distinctive
“we” and “them” duality that is essential to community identity.111 The
campaign portrayed homosexuals as “immoral and against God’s
wishes,”112 who could recruit children into their lifestyle.113 Further, the
campaign conveyed the message that it was a protector of those associated
with the majority group; namely that “our” children must be protected from
homosexuals, the “them.” The success of group construction was evident:
the Miami ordinance was repealed by a two-to-one margin and successive
anti-gay campaigns followed throughout the nation.114
The military prohibition of homosexual service members is no different. For instance, the World War II prohibition on homosexuality in the
military was based on such expression of homosexuality. Persons with
“feminine bodily characteristics” or those who exhibited “effeminacy in
dress and manner” were precluded from military service.115 Professor Ken

111. CARL COON, ONE PLANET, ONE PEOPLE: BEYOND “US VS. THEM” 30 (2004).
112. ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION’S
FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 41, 47 (1977).
113. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1014-18 (providing an overview and analysis of the Save
our Children campaign). Several others joined Bryant’s efforts in Florida. Jerry Falwell, for
instance, stated at a Miami rally that “[s]o called gay folks [would] just as soon kill you as look at
you.” DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A
GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 306 (1999). See BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY
AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT 103-04 (1987) (discussing anti-gay campaigns in their greater social
context); Allan H. Terl, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida, 24 NOVA
L. REV. 793, passim (2000) (reviewing the history of Florida’s gay rights movement as well as the
state’s anti-sodomy laws).
114. Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1017.
115. BERUBE, supra note 53, at 19. Different courts have approached homosexual identity
differently. Some jurisdictions have equated homosexuality with homosexual conduct; to be gay
means to have gay sex. The direct criminalization of homosexual conduct is the epitome of such
an approach. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986) (viewing homosexual
identity in terms of homosexual conduct); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(defining homosexuals as “persons who engage in homosexual conduct”); High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that gay conduct
did not warrant quasi-suspect classification); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that gay conduct does not warrant a suspect or quasi-suspect classification because
states are permitted to criminalize such activity). Other jurisdictions have looked to conformity
with homosexual stereotypes as dispositive of homosexuality. For instance, in Beller v.
Middendorf, a service member was retained in the armed forces even after he committed homosexual conduct because he “did not appear to be ‘a homosexual’ and . . . he found no evidence of
psychosis or neurosis.” Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1980). For a discussion
of the differing judicial treatments of homosexual identity see Bobbi Bernstein, Note, Power,
Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating “Outness” Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47
STAN. L. REV. 269, 283-87 (1995).
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Karst has asserted that with regard to the military, the identity that is to be
projected is that of a masculine male.116 Again, the “we” versus “them”
bifurcation prerequisite to group subjugation is evident.
Yet the social stereotyping of homosexuals as “feminine”—a form of
group construction—is supplemented by the government’s condemnation of
homosexual identity. Until Lawrence, sodomy laws were kept on the books
notwithstanding their rare enforcement.117 Indeed, law can be viewed as a
form of communication. It originates from the communicator and is directed at a target audience. However, contained in the communication that
is law are three components: its policy content, authority signal, and control
intention.118 The policy content is the prescription, the intent of the law.
The authority signal is the basis of legitimacy in which the law originates,
such as the federal government in the case of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.
Lastly, the control intention describes the enforcement power behind the
law.119 Thus to be considered legitimate, the policy content of the law must
originate from a legitimate basis and be accompanied by symbols or
markers indicating general community acceptance.120
At the essence of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is a group deprivation. The
policy content of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is a condemnation of homosexuality. Because the law must rest on a legitimate basis (a popularly elected
government), and be accompanied by general community acceptance (the
majority, non-homosexual group), the law serves as the basis for a majority
group dominating a minority group. Interestingly however, Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell is a law that begs not to be enforced; it says you may serve if
you are gay, just so long as the military does not know. The prohibition on
homosexuals from serving in the military only operates upon the disclosure
of a service member’s sexual identity.121 Furthermore, even when such

116. Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual
Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 279 (1995). See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge,
Recent Development, Military Women in Nontraditional Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed
Forces’ War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 215, 237-38 (1990) (discussing the
expectation of conforming with a gender-specific norm in the military).
117. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced”
Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 35, 114 (2000).
118. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75
PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 101, 108-10 (1981); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The
Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made, 6 YALE
STUD. IN WORLD. PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980).
119. Reisman, supra note 118, at 108–10.
120. Id.
121. See discussion supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the blackletter prohibition).
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disclosures are made, the policy is selectively enforced, subject to the
discretion of commanding officers.122
The policy sciences also shed light on the participants and mechanisms
of law as communication by asking a series of questions: who, says what,
about what, in which channel, to whom, and with what effect?123 When we
begin to analyze the structure of the legal communication of Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell, the model of group deprivation becomes clearer. The initiator
of the communicator (the “who”) and the content of the communication (the
“says what”) do not require elaboration. More interesting is the question of
the channel of the communication and social context in which the communication take place. The channel of the communication examines how the
targets of the communication (the public and service members) understand
its intended effect.124 The question of “about what” looks at the
prescriptive content of a law in its broader context.125
It does not seem that there is a community expectation that homosexuals will be prevented from serving in the military. The government, by
the nature of the policy itself, does not likewise seem to want to prevent
homosexuals from serving in the military. Thus, the prescription of the
policy is against open homosexuality. Considering the channel of the
communication and its social environs is essential to understanding the
nature of group deprivation.126 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is at its most basic a
condemnation of being openly gay. Indeed, law (ideally) reflects social
norms; a government or majoritarian ban on gay identity is the foundation
of a group deprivation.127
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell also functionally replicates sodomy laws within
the military context in that it criminalizes same-sex intimacy. PreLawrence sodomy laws did, like Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, contain a message
of societal disapproval of homosexual intimacy. Additionally, both sodomy

122. See discussions supra Part II.C.1 & infra Part IV.B (discussing command discretion in,
and the selective enforcement of, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell).
123. Harold D. Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in THE
COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES 37, 37 (Lyman Bryson ed., 1964).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. KENNETH KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 209 (1993). Professor Karst notes that “[t]he
principle of equal citizenship [is not] substantively neutral; its values of respect, responsibility,
and participation . . . look toward a society that embraces all Americans as full members. . . .
[E]qual citizenship implies tolerance.” Id.
127. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) (“Since the citizens of a
society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one
conception to another, either because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or
because one is held by the more numerous or more powerful group.”).
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laws and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell go further by creating a “criminal class.”128
The policy content also works negatively in that it reinforces social
meanings. Professor Andrew Koppelman observed that:
The social meanings that societies reproduce sometimes include
meanings which divide members of a society into classes on the
basis of ascribed characteristics and assign some of these classes
lower status, in terms of power and prestige, than others. These
meanings stigmatize the people at the bottom of the hierarchy,
branding them as intrinsically less worthy of concern and respect
than others. . . . Members of the privileged groups will . . . [use]
their greater powers in ways that maintain the stigmatized groups’
subordinate status symbolically, politically, and materially.129
Thus, to the extent that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell formalizes government
condemnation of homosexuality, it also reinforces social stereotypes and
attitudes toward homosexuals and homosexuality. The policy perpetuates
the “we” versus “them” by reinforcing social construction of a minority
group identity. This is why the criminalization of homosexual conduct and
identity in the military stigmatizes homosexuality and perpetuates homophobic attitudes against gay and lesbian service members.130
The military regulations do not punish service members for gay
“associational activity,” however. Credible evidence, which serves as the
basis of an inquiry in the propensity of a service member to engage in
homosexual acts, does not include going to a gay bar, possessing or reading
gay-oriented publications, associating with open homosexuals, or even
attending a gay rights parade.131 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell permits non-sexual,
associational conduct of a gay soldier’s identity but not the expression of

128. Leslie, supra note 117, at 110. See Terl, supra note 113, at 794-805 (discussing the
effects of Florida’s anti-sodomy statute).
129. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 94-95
(1996). Professor Koppelman also notes that “state efforts to reduce any kind of discrimination
will implicitly tell those whose. . . beliefs sanction such discrimination that their. . . beliefs are
false and that they ought to change them. . . .” Id. at 152. Thus, the continuation of the policy will
reinforce “social mores” and decreases the “likelihood that eventually homosexuality [will] be
regarded as in no way inferior to heterosexuality.” Id. at 3.
130. See KARST, supra note 126, at 186 (1993) (noting that “Stigma—especially stigma
propagated by government—produces harms that are both immediate and consequential. The
immediate harms are psychic: insult, humiliation, indignity for the people stigmatized.”); DONALD
WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 10 (1975) (“A
person cannot live in an atmosphere of universal rejection, of widespread pretense, of a society
that outlaws and banishes his activities and desires, of a social world that jokes and sneers at every
turn, without a fundamental influence on his personality.”).
131. DoD Directive 1332.14, encl. 4, § E(4); DoD Directive 1332.30, encl. 8, § C.3.d., at 82; Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 932 (4th Cir. 1996).
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the identity itself.132 There seems to be an inherent non sequitur in the
policy; it is okay to engage in group-based activities essential for the
formation of an identity that is illegal.
Condoning associational activity is demonstrative that the military
recognizes that being homosexual or supporting homosexuals implicates the
First Amendment. The third party expression of sexual identity is permitted
under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, yet the expression of sexual identity in intimate associations so fundamental to a person’s sense of self is precluded.
This is done notwithstanding the military’s own belief that “sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter” and “is not a bar to
continued service.”133 Thus, an inherent contradiction emerges. The military permits the expression of sexual identity only when it does not arise
from an intimate association fundamental to a person’s identity. These
expressive associations lay at the heart of the First Amendment.134
B. SILENCE AS COMPELLED AFFIRMATION
The First Amendment approach to protecting sexual identity is
strengthened further by the fact that silence can equate to speech as well as
a compelled affirmation.135 For instance, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,136 the Supreme Court held that requiring adolescent
pupils to recite the pledge of allegiance was unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.137 The Court stated that an “involuntary affirmation”
to a belief could be more sinister than requiring silence in the face of a clear
and present danger.138 The First Amendment is implicated in both cases of

132. See Mazur, supra note 62, at 248 (arguing that the associational exception was
motivated by the desire to protect heterosexual soldiers rather than grant homosexual service
members a realm of protection).
133. DoD Directive 1332.30, encl. 2, § C, at 2-1.
134. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). Justice Brennan noted
that freedom of association is judicially protected in two ways. Id. Supreme Court jurisprudence
has first “concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships
must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” Id. He also
noted that the “Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First—Amendment speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Id.
135. Wolff, supra note 5, at 1174.
136. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
137. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
138. Id. at 633. Barnette involved a West Virginia law requiring the public “teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism.” Id. at 626 n.1 (quoting W.
VA. CODE ANN § 1734 (1941 supp.)). Pursuant to the law, the School Board adopted a resolution
mandating a compulsory flag salute. Id. The Supreme Court, in invalidating the law, stated that:
It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more
immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here the power of compulsion is

198

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:175

compelled silence and compelled affirmations.
The Court further
articulated this point in a subsequent term by stating that compelled
affirmative acts are a more serious encroachment on personal liberty than
passive acts.139 Barnette and its progeny, according to Professor Tobias
Wolff, can be read to hold that the seriousness of a compelled affirmation
may be measured along two dimensions. The first is the extent to which the
speaker is “intimately” related to the compelled affirmation.140 The second
is the extent a speaker can dissent from the message.141
Homosexual identity is by its very nature expressive. Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell not only forbids speech, but also creates the presumption of
heterosexuality, thereby burdening both dimensions of Barnette. By
forcing one to remain silent about his or her homosexuality, gay and lesbian
soldiers are effectively compelled to make false affirmations regarding their
sexual identities. Such affirmations regarding one of the most fundamental
aspects of personhood lie at the center of the First Amendment:
fundamental personhood cannot be infringed upon.142
Recall the military uniform regulations at issue in Goldman v.
Weinberger.143 The ban on wearing yarmulkes while in uniform did not
target religious identity.144 No one told Goldman that he was unable to
proclaim or otherwise conceal the fact that he was Jewish; he was only
deprived of one “mode” of identity expression, not the identity itself.145 He
was not forced to assimilate his identity as a kulturkampf would otherwise
require.
invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual
creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle
expression. To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of
Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.
Id. at 633-34. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974) (holding
that a newspaper has a First Amendment right to omit or print materials in its publication).
139. Wooly v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 715, 717 (1977). The New Hampshire state motto “Live
Free or Die” was required to be printed on every noncommercial license plate, and it was deemed
a misdemeanor to obscure any part of the license plate including the slogan. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 263:1 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975). Two Jehovah’s
Witnesses, finding the motto offensive to their moral and religious sensibilities, covered that
portion of the license plate and were convicted of a misdemeanor. Wooly, 430 U.S. at 707-08.
The Court held that the statutes required, in effect, the use of “private property as a ‘mobile
billboard’ for the State’s ideological message or suffer a penalty.” Id. at 715. Because the First
Amendment protects against compelled speech, the statute was invalidated. Id. at 717.
140. Wolff, supra note 5, at 1200.
141. Id.
142. Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 782-84.
143. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, at 504-06 (1986). See supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
144. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 518-19.
145. Wolff, supra note 5, at 1187.
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Homosexual soldiers are, however, subject to the entire scope of what
the kulturkampf seeks to attain: forced assimilation of the minority’s
identity to that of the majority. The policy does not necessarily condone
homosexuality per se, only when it is communicated vis-à-vis another
person by words, affection, or physical conduct. Yet since that communication is an essential part of personhood and gay identity itself, the
communication of identity cannot be separated from the identity itself.
IV. THE CASE FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
SEXUAL IDENTITY IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT
Challenging Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in light of the foregoing construction of gay identity would be difficult without a concrete constitutional
basis upon which a claim might be asserted. This is particularly true
considering the deference the federal judiciary has given to military policy.
However, Lawrence v. Texas 146 may serve as such a basis.147 In addition to
Lawrence’s blackletter commands, the opinion signifies something much
deeper: the protection of identity and the formation thereof. To formulate a
First Amendment litigation pathway, which could possibly overcome the
judicial reluctance to interfere with military policy, Lawrence must be
analyzed in the context of its jurisprudential predecessors. The following
sections provide such an analysis of Lawrence and its military application,
as well as a survey of recent post-Lawrence challenges to Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.
A. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: THE BEGINNING OF THE END?
In 1986 the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia criminal statute
criminalizing consensual sodomy.148 The Supreme Court held, over a
learned dissent,149 that neither due process nor considerations of privacy

146. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
147. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (holding that a state statute which makes it a crime
for two people of the same sex to engage in sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause).
148. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986). See GA. CODE ANN . § 16-6-2 (1984)
(“A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. . . . [A] person
convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor
more than 20 years.”).
149. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens in dissent stated that:
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.
Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their
physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of
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granted homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in consensual intimacy.150 However, that holding was reversed in 2003 when the Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause granted a privacy interest encompassing homosexual sodomy. As such, a state could not constitutionally
criminalize sodomy. However, as it will be seen, the mandates of Lawrence
go far beyond the confines of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.
1.

Lawrence and Expressive Personhood

It would appear from the foregoing that the federal judiciary is
disinclined to spontaneously reverse its trend of deference to military and
congressional policy regarding homosexual service members. Enter
Lawrence v. Texas; it is improbable that when the Houston Police broke
down their door, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner fully conceptualized the
moment’s immense implications on the constitutional status of gay and
lesbian individuals. Some legal commentators have gone so far as to compare the significance of Lawrence to that of Brown v. Board of
Education.151
At issue in Lawrence was a Texas statute illegalizing same-sex
sodomy.152 The Supreme Court, in invalidating the statute, stated that the
conduct at issue—homosexual intimacy—was within the “realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.”153 The majority based its
rationale on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but did
not clearly articulate the precise standard by which due process was to be
applied.154 The Court noted that the Due Process Clause had substantively
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married
persons.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 190-92.
151. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1399-1400 n.2 (2004) (noting the commentators who have recognized the potential
immense implications of Lawrence); ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO
THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 138-40 (2004)
(noting the potential impact Lawrence has on future gay rights litigation).
152. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (2003) (“A person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex.”).
153. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
154. Id. at 573-78. There is some dispute as to whether the majority relied on a heightened
form of rational basis review. Id. Justice Kennedy stated the Texas statute at issue “furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.” Id. at 578. However the majority did not explicitly state that rational basis review
was appropriate for classifications drawn on the basis of sexual orientation. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia read rational basis into the majority’s opinion. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet the
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been extended to protect the privacy of marital relationships and decisions
of contraception between consenting adults.155 The Court ruled that there
was a due process liberty “concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring,” relying on the
rationale of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick.156
The language of the opinion was not confined to merely the privacy of
gays and lesbians, criminality of sexual conduct, or substantive rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, Justice Kennedy spoke in terms of
dignity and personhood as dispositive elements whereby the state could not
regulate. The Court stated that the aspects of personhood—“one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”—cannot be formed under compulsion of the State.157 Moreover,
criminalizing actions so fundamental to the formation of identity invites
public and private discrimination towards homosexuals158 and “demeans the
lives of homosexual persons.”159 The Court created a liberty interest
encompassing private sexual relations, including relations between consenting homosexuals.
However, the Court did not restrict the applicability of Lawrence to the
confines of the bedroom, as would otherwise be the logical extension of the
privacy jurisprudence on which the majority rested its due process rationale.
On the contrary, Justice Kennedy noted that the liberty interest he was
about to articulate extended “beyond spatial bounds.”160 He added that:
[T]here are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
majority consistently spoke of something “fundamental.” Id. at 565. Justice Kennedy quoted
Eisenstadt v. Baird, which stated: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Id. at 565
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added)). Justice Kennedy also
took note that Supreme Court precedence “recognized the right of a woman to make certain
fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty
under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining
the rights of the person.” Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia noted the majority’s discussion of
“fundamental propositions” and “fundamental decisions” but took pains to note that the majority
did not expressly declare that homosexual sodomy was a fundamental right when it applied “an
unheard-of form of rational-basis review.” Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 564-65.
156. Id. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
157. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
158. Id. at 575.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 562.

202

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:175

autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions.161
Although the Court expressly invalidated a criminal statute inconsistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the language of
the opinion went much further. Lawrence spoke of the burdens that the law
placed on personhood. In essence, the “privacy of the closet” was rejected
in Lawrence in favor of an “expressive and declarative space.” 162 Emancipation from the confines of the closet is essential for the self-realization of
personhood because of the inherent expressive nature of identity formation.163 Because the formation of sexual identity is realized through human
interactions and the outward expression of such identity and intimacy, there
must also be a corresponding liberty that extends beyond “being” to “expressing.” Justice Kennedy recognized this fact and thus began the opinion
in terms of liberty outside the realm of a bilateral relationship. The Court
recognized that social norms had shifted to include homosexuality within
the definition of citizenship,164 and thus was “protecting the right of adults
to define for themselves the borders and contents of deeply personal human
relationships.”165
As the majority noted, an attractive alternative ground for attacking the
holding of Bowers was the Equal Protection Clause.166 Justice O’Connor,

161. Id.
162. Sonia K. Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of
Lawrence, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1429, 1441-42 (2006) (citing EVE KOSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990)).
163. See id. at 1442 (“By ‘coming out,’ one crosses the border from a ‘love that dare not
speak its name’ to gay self-actualization, gay personhood. What is invisible and therefore nonexistent becomes visible, expressive and present: as a result, the personal declaration of ‘coming
out’ becomes instead a politicized statement of personhood.”).
164. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to
Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1062 (2004).
165. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1915 (2004). Professor Tribe further stated that Lawrence
did not hold that homosexual acts were fundamental, but rather that “the relationships and selfgoverning commitments out of which those acts arise—the network of human connection over
time that makes genuine freedom possible.” Id. at 1955. Sonia Katyal notes that Lawrence’s
“framework of deliberative autonomy and expressive liberty” rests on cultural and social norms
for its “execution and attainment,” and may yield the biggest efficacy benefits. Katyal, supra note
162, at 1479-80. See Sonia K. Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 108
(2002) (arguing that successful pre-Lawrence gay rights litigation depended on “propagating a
model of ‘gay personhood’ or ‘gay essentialism’”).
166. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575-76 (2003). The Court found an equal protection
challenge to Bowers to be a “tenable argument” but concluded that such a challenge would lead
some “question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the
conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.” Id. at 574-75. Indeed, the Texas
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however, chose to rest her concurrence on such a rationale. Where the
majority left the question open as to what due process standard is applicable
to homosexual relationships, Justice O’Connor saw rational basis to be
appropriate for purposes of equal protection.167 The command of the Equal
Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.”168 Because the Texas statute criminalized
homosexual sodomy but not sodomy between heterosexuals, it violated the
Equal Protection Clause.169
The traditional, high-degree of judicial deference inherent in rational
basis scrutiny was not applied in Lawrence.170 Indeed, Justice O’Connor
aimed to preserve Bowers’ holding that due process was not violated by a
state law criminalizing sodomy.171 Her concurrence rested on the precept
that because moral disapproval is insufficient to pass rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Texas statute criminalizing only
homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional.172 Interestingly, the concurrence
looked to the operation of the law. Justice O’Connor noted that “the effect
of Texas’ sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of prosecution . . . [it]
brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.” 173
Moreover, the concurrence took note that Texas had stipulated that the
statute “‘legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety
of ways unrelated to the criminal law,’ including in the areas of
‘employment, family issues, and housing.’”174 In her rational basis application to the facts, Justice O’Connor looked beyond the “legitimate purpose”
required by the Court’s rational basis jurisprudence to how the law
operated.

statute did not criminalize sodomy between consenting heterosexuals. The Texas statute in
question read: “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003).
167. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 579 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
169. Id. at 581.
170. Rational basis review usually involves a high degree of judicial deference in that
“[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 42627 (1961). The presumption of validity can “only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness
and irrationality.” Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981).
171. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 580 (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996)).
173. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 582 (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992)).

204

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:175

A similar application of rational basis scrutiny was made in
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.175 At issue in Moreno was the
constitutionality of a provision in the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which prevented households domiciling unrelated individuals from participating in
the program.176 The legislative record, however, suggested that the provision was designed to prevent “hippies” and “hippie communes” from
receiving food stamps despite the government’s assertion that its purpose
was to prevent fraud.177 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, looked to
the “practical effect” of the legislation as part of his equal protection
analysis, although he noted the highly deferential rational basis scrutiny was
applicable.178 He famously stated that “[f]or if the constitutional conception
of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”179 The Court found
no independent rational basis on which the legislation stood, other than to
exclude otherwise eligible participants who, by their economic circumstances, could not afford to alter their living arrangements to maintain
eligibility in the program.180
The Supreme Court extended and refined this application of equal
protection to a classification based on homosexuality in Romer v. Evans.181
Romer involved the validity of Amendment 2, a publicly-adopted referendum to the Colorado constitution forbidding municipalities from passing
any ordinance protecting homosexuals.182 The Supreme Court invalidated
the amendment on equal protection grounds, ostensibly using rational basis
scrutiny.183 However, as in Moreno, the Romer majority looked between

175. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
176. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
177. Id. at 534 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, at. 8; 116 Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970)
(Sen. Holland)).
178. Id. at 537.
179. Id. at 534.
180. Id. at 538.
181. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
182. Id. at 624. Amendment 2 stated that:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO .CONST. art II, § 30b (repealed 1996).
183. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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the lines of the amendment to its functional operation and “ultimate
effect.”184 The Supreme Court noted that Amendment 2 imposed “a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group” based on its broad
and unqualified language.185 Moreover, its “breadth” was so broad that its
rationale was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”186
When read in conjunction with Moreno and Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lawrence, it is evident why arguing for heightened equal
protection scrutiny is so enticing. The language of Romer, like that of the
majority in Lawrence, speaks to something deeper: a group deprivation.
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority in Romer, stated that
Amendment 2 “does no more than deprive homosexuals of special
rights. . . . [It] imposes a special disability upon those persons alone.
Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek
without constraint.”187 Furthermore, the Court noted that Amendment 2
“identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across
the board.”188 The majority concluded its opinion by stating that:
[I]n making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall
not have any particular protections from the law, [Amendment 2]
inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that
outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed
for it. . . . It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual
context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its
own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.
“Class legislation. . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” We must conclude that Amendment
2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but
to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.
A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.189
The Supreme Court discussed the impropriety of a group deprivation.190
Indeed, the identification of a single group—the “we” versus “them” duality

184. Id. at 627 (citation omitted).
185. Id. at 632.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 631.
188. Id. at 633.
189. Id. at 635 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
190. For an excellent discussion of equal protection and citizenship implications of Romer
see generally Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of
Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453, passim (1997); see also KARST, supra note 126, at 187
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inherent in a group deprivation—is violative of the promise of equal
protection “that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial
terms to all who seek its assistance.”191
Romer’s promise of invalidating group-based deprivations does not
cure its inherent shortcoming, however. It takes group deprivation at face
value without deconstructing the nature of the group. Romer failed to
construct the nature of homosexual identity, namely its communicative
nature. This is why Lawrence was such an important development; it took
note of the communicative nature of sexual identity and sought to protect it.
Yet as the constitutional basis of Lawrence and Romer focused on the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, litigation avenues have continued to
rely on their juridical confines. The unsuccessful challenges regarding a
major piece of legislation such as Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is somewhat
predictable, however. Lower courts do not seem receptive to providing
homosexuals with a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. Thus, as will be
demonstrated in the following sections, the traditional presumption of
validity and deference permeates Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell jurisprudence.
2.

Military Application of Lawrence

There has been considerable debate about what Lawrence v. Texas
actually means, including within the context of the United State military.192
The first instance in which the military had to reconcile Lawrence with the

(“[J]udges need to be alert to the expressive qualities of law, particularly the capacity of law’s
expression to inflict the direct harms of stigma and stereotype.”).
191. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. As the Court noted, Amendment 2 had “the peculiar property
of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group. . .” Id. at 632. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Forward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 (1996) (“If
Romer is to be defended, it must be because the grounds for Amendment 2 are, in a deliberative
democracy, properly ruled off-limits, because the Amendment reflects a judgment that certain
citizens should be treated as social outcasts.”).
192. See, e.g., Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due
Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (2005) (arguing that Lawrence is significant because it
was the first case to bring fundamental rights doctrine and due process balancing cases together);
Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the
Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1231 (2004) (stating that Lawrence
opens the door to due process obligations on the part of states to recognize same-sex marriage);
Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 311, 319-20 (2004)
(asserting that the rights in Lawrence are not absolute and do not encompass gay marriage); Berta
E. Hernndez-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1263 (2004) (stating that
Lawrence, despite ambiguity, maps out an antisubordinate model of jurisprudence because
Lawrence “at its foundation . . . embraces the radical idea that gays and lesbians are people, too”);
Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and
Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 112 (2003) (arguing that Lawrence was
revolutionary in the respect that the judicial inquiry shifted from one examining the “traditions of
our ancestors” to measuring the daily impact of a law, disregarding “[p]opular notions of
morality” as a sufficient justification for discriminatory legislation).
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prohibitions on sodomy within the military was in the case of Sergeant Eric
P. Marcum. Sergeant Marcum was convicted of engaging in homosexual
sodomy with a lower grade soldier within his chain of command.193 The
government asserted that Lawrence did not apply to the military ban on
homosexual sodomy because of the distinctiveness of military life as
recognized in Parker v. Levy.194 The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces in United States v. Marcum195 upheld the conviction, but not before
conceding that Lawrence has applicability in the military context.196
The court of appeals in Marcum acknowledged the established wisdom
of Levy that civilian culture is distinct from military life, thus the context of
any action must be judged in terms of military readiness.197 The court also
acknowledged that soldiers “may not be stripped of basic rights simply
because they have doffed their civilian clothes.” 198 As such, the Bill of
Rights was applicable to members in the armed forces except in instances
where the “express terms” of the Constitution require such application.199 It
was noted that the ban on homosexual sodomy in the armed forces, enacted
pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority, was done prior to
Lawrence.200 Prior courts-martial and separation proceedings involving
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell occurred while the “operative constitutional
backdrop” was still Bowers v. Hardwick.201
The court of appeals made another observation regarding the core
holding of Lawrence. It noted that Lawrence rejected the notion that
Bowers stood only for the right to engage in particular sexual practices.202
Rather, the court acknowledged that “‘[t]he State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.’”203 Marcum also held that the liberty interest of Lawrence was not
constructed by the Supreme Court in such a way as to preclude its application to the military.204 Thus, private intimacy between two consenting

193. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 200-01 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
194. Id. at 202. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (discussing the differences
between civilian and military life).
195. 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
196. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208.
197. Id. at 205.
198. Id. (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 206 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)).
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
203. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
204. Id.
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adults was held to fall within the liberty interest created by the Supreme
Court in Lawrence. 205
The court of appeals was not prepared to apply Lawrence en masse to
the military context. What emerged from the opinion was a three part test
to ascertain the legality of consensual sexual relations in the armed forces.
After a service member’s conduct is found to be in the zone of liberty
created by Lawrence, the military tribunal will look to any factors that the
Supreme Court held were outside the decision’s purview.206 Lastly, any
additional factors “relevant solely in the military environment” affecting the
scope of Lawrence will be considered.207
Sergeant Marcum’s conduct involved a subordinate airman within his
chain of command.208 It thus not only fell outside the protections of
Lawrence, but was also prohibited by Air Force policy applicable to both
homosexuals and heterosexuals.209 The court of appeals acknowledged that
the relationship was the type in which “consent might not easily be
refused.”210 Thus, the conviction was affirmed not on the grounds that
Lawrence did not apply to the military, but rather because the liberty
interest at stake in Lawrence did not encompass relationships characterized
by power asymmetries.
B. A SURVEY OF RECENT CHALLENGES
A true portrait of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is incomplete without
examining the stories of individual soldiers, and detailing how the policy
actually operates. Some service members prosecuted under the policy
engaged in conduct deemed reprehensible regardless of their sexual
orientation.211 Others, like Major Margaret Witt have been subjected to
manifest injustice stemming from the burdens imposed by the policy on
205. Id. at 206. The dissent in Marcum acknowledged the majority’s holding that the
conduct of Sergeant Marcum fell within the Lawrence liberty interest. Id. at 212 (Crawford, C.J.,
dissenting). A similar result was reached in United States v. Stirewalt in which the court of
appeals held that a soldier’s conduct regarding sodomy fell within the liberty interest of Lawrence
v. Texas. United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
206. Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206-07.
207. Id. at 207.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 208.
210. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). The court of appeals in
Stirewalt, however, held that the liberty interest of Lawrence did not extend to consensual
homosexual relationships occurring on a coast guard cutter on active duty. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. at
304. The court of appeals also held that the relationship in Stirewalt was analogous to that in
Marcum in that the relationship was between a commissioned department head and subordinate
enlisted crewman. Id.
211. See, e.g., Marcum, 60 M.J. at 200-01 (discussing whether a sexual encounter between
two service members was consensual).
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service members and the discretion vested with individual commanders. To
say Major Witt was an exemplary Air Force service member is an understatement.212 Yet in the summer of 2004, the Air Force began investigating
an anonymous allegation that Major Witt was a lesbian.213 Specifically, the
investigation sought to ascertain whether Witt was in a relationship with a
civilian partner from 1997 to 2003.214 During the inquiry Major Witt never
spoke or otherwise disclosed her sexual orientation to her commander. 215
The Air Force found no instances in which Major Witt engaged in homosexual conduct on base, nor that her partner was, or had ever been, a
member of the armed forces.216 Nevertheless, separation proceedings
commenced pursuant to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.217 Major Witt sought a
preliminary injunction to allow her to earn points toward promotion and her
pension.218 She alleged that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell post-Lawrence was
unconstitutional on First Amendment, Equal Protection, and substantive
Due Process grounds.219
The District Court for the Western District of Washington rejected
Major Witt’s claims and upheld Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell as constitutional.220
Specifically, the district court stated that the Marcum criteria were applicable only in cases that dealt with the criminalization of sodomy.221 The
court further held that Lawrence “did not change constitutional
jurisprudence in a way that impacts the validity” of Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.222 The court considered the implications of Lawrence only in the
context of its due process and equal protection analyses.223 The opinion
stressed that Lawrence stood for rational basis review; since homosexuals
were not subject to a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, Don’t Ask,
212. Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1141 (W.D. Wash. 2006),
vacated in part by Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, No. 06-35644, slip op. (9th Cir. May 21,
2008). Among the medals Major Witt was awarded in her nineteen years of service were:
Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, Aerial Achievement Medal, Air Force Commendation
Medal, Air Force Achievement Medal, Air Force Outstanding, Unit Award With Valor, Combat
Readiness Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Air
Force Overseas Ribbon Long, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, and Small Arms Expert
Markmanship Ribbon. Compl. of Pet. at ¶ 20, Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, Case 3:06-CV05195 (W.D. Wash., 2006).
213. Witt, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1148.
221. Id. at 1143.
222. Id. at 1144.
223. Id. at 1142-45.
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Don’t Tell was subject to pre-2003 equal protection analysis.224 Relying on
the traditional notion of judicial deference to military policy, the court
stated that precluding homosexuals from openly serving in the military was
valid.225
The district court further found that the First Amendment did not
render Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell unconstitutional.226 The court stated that the
right to intimate associations has not been extended to the context of homosexual relationships.227 Moreover, the court cited to Thomasson for the
proposition that the spoken proclamation of one’s sexual identity was not,
in effect, speech protected by the First Amendment.228 Rather, admissions
served only as evidentiary purposes for the purpose of ascertaining a
soldier’s propensity to engage in prohibited homosexual contact.229
The district court failed to account for a fundamental point articulated
in Marcum. Previous challenges to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell were adjudicated
when Bowers served as the jurisprudential underpinning.230 The court only
considered the impact of Lawrence on the level of equal protection review
rather than its impact on all claims asserted.231 Thus, the implications of
Lawrence on the First Amendment rights of service members escaped the
analysis. More specifically, the court’s analysis failed to read the Supreme
Court’s holding in Lawrence with expressive identity cases. Lawrence held
that there was a liberty interest in consensual homosexual relationships—a
realm of privacy that is free from government intrusion.232 Yet the
operation of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is compelled affirmation—a de facto
intrusion into the sexual identity of a person.233 The Supreme Court held
that homosexuality cannot be criminalized. As such, there seems to emerge
a corresponding liberty inherent in personal identity that prevents

224. Id. at 1145. The district court stated that “Lawrence is based on rational basis review;
the same level of scrutiny applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in upholding the
constitutionality of [Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell] prior to Lawrence.” Id. at 1144.
225. Id. at 1145. The district court noted that “[t]he government’s rationale for [Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell] is that excluding from military service homosexuals who engage in or have the
propensity to engage in homosexual acts further discipline and combat readiness in the military by
preventing risks to unit cohesion posed by the presence of such homosexuals.” Id.
226. Id. at 1146-47.
227. Id. at 1146.
228. Id.
229. See id. (“The Fourth Circuit held that the statement prong of [Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell] is
not directed at speech and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.”). For a discussion of
Thomasson v. Perry, see supra text accompanying notes 73-87.
230. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
231. Id. at 205.
232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
233. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B (discussing the formation and dynamics of gay
identity).
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penalizing the expression of one’s sexual identity, which the district court
failed to recognize.
A similar result was reached by the Massachusetts Federal District
Court in Cook v. Rumsfeld.234 At issue was the discharge of twelve service
members pursuant to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.235 One of these service
members was Specialist (SPC) Thomas Cook, who had joined the U.S.
Army in April 2001, was given an intelligence specialty, and was deployed
to Kuwait in April 2002.236 He and his company were ordered to deploy to
Iraq in the lead-up to Iraqi Freedom.237 During a field training exercise,
SPC Cook’s team leader stated that “[i]f I ever found out someone in my
crew was gay, I would kill him.”238 Unaware of any channel by which confidentiality could be assured, SPC Cook informed his battalion commander
that he was a homosexual.239
Another service member, Lieutenant Jenny Lynn Kopfstein, entered the
U.S. Navy in 1995.240 She had previously graduated from the Naval
Academy and was assigned to the U.S.S. Shiloh.241 Despite the fact that
Lieutenant Kopfstein disclosed her homosexuality to her commanding
officer, she was not separated from the armed forces. Rather, she was reassigned to support operation Enduring Freedom and was kept on the ship for
twenty-two months, during which time she received numerous awards and
honors.242 Nineteen months after Lieutenant Kopfstein disclosed her homosexuality, a board of inquiry convened and recommended that she be
separated from the Navy under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, notwithstanding the
fact that her Captain testified on her behalf.243
SPC Cook, Lieutenant Kopfstein, and ten other service members in
comparable circumstances challenged their discharges and alleged that in
light of Lawrence, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment.244 Like their counterparts in Witt, the district court held that
234. 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass., 2006)
235. Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
236. Complaint at ¶ 63-64, Cook v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-CV-12546-GAO (D. Mass., filed Dec.
6, 2004). SPC Cook had also been awarded the Army Achievement Medal for his service. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. ¶ 66.
239. Id. ¶ 66-67.
240. Id. ¶ 110.
241. Id. ¶ 110-11.
242. Id. ¶ 111-13. Kopfstein was, during this time, qualified as “Officer of the Deck
Underway,” giving her the authority to take command of the U.S.S. Shiloh in certain circumstances. Id. ¶ 113.
243. Id. ¶ 114-16.
244. Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390-91 (D. Mass., 2006).
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Lawrence did not warrant treating “plaintiffs’ articulated liberty interest as
a ‘fundamental’ interest calling for heightened scrutiny in judicial review of
the legislative decision-making.”245 Moreover, traditional notions of
judicial deference necessitated finding that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was a
legitimate policy of Congress.246
Also like their counterparts in Witt, the district court held that Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell did not target speech.247 The court noted that speaking
about one’s propensity, intent, or conduct, “does not mean that a governmental regulation pertaining to the conduct is also an impermissible
restriction on speaking about it.”248 The district court interpreted expressive
identity speech in Thomasson terms as only evidence of propensity.249 As
such the First Amendment was not implicated.250
The district court thus missed the essential holding of Lawrence, that
there exists an interest of sexual intimacy which extends beyond private
realm. Lawrence was only read by the district court in terms of the level of
review applicable to the equal protection and due process claims asserted.251
It did not consider Lawrence in light of gay identity, and thus expression, as
an element of personhood, which was free from government interference.
Moreover, the district court failed to account for Lawrence’s applicability in
the military context as articulated in Marcum.252 The district court
accordingly upheld Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell as compatible with the First
Amendment.253
Of course, one would be remiss not to highlight the immense financial
stake many service members have in continuing their military careers;
receiving pensions and education reimbursements are such considerations.
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Loomis, for instance, began his military career
with a tour of duty in Vietnam, during which he was awarded two Bronze
Stars for valor and a Purple Heart.254 In March of 1995 Lieutenant Colonel

245. Id. at 395.
246. Id. at 397-98.
247. Id. at 409-10.
248. Id. at 407.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 408.
251. Id. at 404.
252. The district court only mentioned Marcum in two footnotes as standing for the
proposition that Lawrence did not articulate a fundamental right. Id. at 384 n.10, 396 n.13. The
court stated that in “‘Lawrence, the Court did not expressly identify the liberty interest as a
fundamental right.’” Id. at 395 n.13 (quoting United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 204-05 (U.S.
Armed Forces, 2004)).
253. Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
254. Loomis v. United Sates, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 505 (Fed. Cl. 2005). Lieutenant Colonel Steve
Loomis was also awarded two Army Achievement Medals, two Army Commendations Medals,
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Loomis began an affair with 19-year-old Private First Class (PFC) Michael
Burdette while both were stationed at Fort Hood Military Reservation.255
During an early intimate encounter, a series of explicit photographs and
videos were consensually taken.256 The affair progressed until August 2006
when PFC Burdette broke into Lieutenant Colonel Loomis’s home in order
to recover the photographs and tapes.257 Being unable to locate them, PFC
Burdette set the house on fire.258 The local fire marshal discovered the
videos and turned them over to the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division
(CID).259 Notwithstanding multiple inconsistencies in PFC Burdette’s
statements to CID and local police officials, the Army chose to initiate
separation proceedings against Lieutenant Colonel Loomis.260 He was
separated from the Army five days prior to being eligible for retirement
benefits.261
Lieutenant Colonel Loomis elected to bring the action in the United
States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act.262 He alleged
that pursuant to military regulations, he should have been afforded the
opportunity to elect retirement in lieu of being forcibly separated from the
armed services.263 Because the elimination proceedings were based upon
the prohibition of homosexual sodomy, Lieutenant Colonel Loomis challenged the constitutional validity of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in light of
Lawrence.264

and four Meritorious Service Medals. Compl. of Pet. ¶ 11, Loomis v. United Sates, Case 1:03CV-01653 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (filed on July 7, 2003).
255. Loomis, 68 Fed. Cl. at 506.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. Separation was recommended by the Board of Inquiry for homosexual acts under
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell as well as for conduct unbecoming of an officer. Id. The Board also
recommended that Lieutenant Colonel Loomis be discharged “Under Other Than Honorable
Conditions” because their “finding of force, coercion, or intimidation in conjunction with homosexual acts and conduct unbecoming an officer.” Id. at 510.
261. Id.
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). The Act provides in part that “[t]he United States Court
of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim . . . upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United
States.” Id. § 1491(a)(1). The Court of Federal Claims also has the authority to “issue orders
directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and
correction of applicable records.” Id. § 1491(a)(2).
263. Loomis, 68 Fed. Cl. at 508. See Army Reg. 600-8-24, § VI, ¶ 4-24a (“An officer
identified for elimination may, at any time during or prior to the final action in the elimination
case, elect one of the following options. . . (3) Apply for retirement in lieu of elimination if
otherwise eligible.”).
264. Loomis, 68 Fed. Cl. at 513.
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The Court of Federal Claims considered the constitutionality of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell on both due process and equal protection grounds. The
court held that Lawrence did not create a fundamental right to engage in
consensual homosexual sodomy.265 It cited Marcum for the proposition
that the Supreme Court “did not expressly identify the liberty interest as a
fundamental right.”266 Moreover, the court ascertained that the standard of
review for an equal protection claim based on sexual orientation was
rational basis.267 The pre-Lawrence usual suspects were relied upon to
support the proposition that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is rationally related to
the legitimate government interest in “promoting unit cohesion” and
“reducing (presumably intra-unit) sexual tension.”268 Thus, the ban on open
homosexuality in the military did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.269
The court in Loomis trapped itself, as did the district courts in Witt and
Cook, into following Lawrence’s red herring: what standard of review is
used for equal protection analysis?270
Notwithstanding setbacks in the district courts, there has been a more
positive reaction to administrative law challenges to the constitutionality of
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Captain John Hensala completed his medical degree
at Northwestern University Medical School prior to receiving his
commission in the Air Force Reserve, Medical Corps.271 Captain Hensala
had participated in the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship
Program in which educational expenses are paid for health professionals in
exchange for military service.272 Prior to starting active duty, he disclosed
during his preliminary medical exam that he was a homosexual.273 The Air
Force did not respond to the admission, and his commanding officer even

265. Id. at 518.
266. Id. at 517 (quoting United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205 (2004)).
267. Id. at 521.
268. Id. at 521-22 (citing Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v.
California Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th
Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996)).
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 212-29, 234-61 and accompanying text.
271. Hensala v. Dep’t of the Air Force (Hensala I), 148 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (N.D. Cal.
2001). Captain Hensala served in the Air Force Reserves for twenty weeks prior to his
graduation. Id. He deferred his active duty while he completed a psychiatric residency at Yale
University in 1993 and a child psychiatry fellowship at the University of San Francisco in 1995.
Id.
272. Id. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2120-27 (2000) (establishing the scholarship program). The
statute also provides that “if such person, voluntarily or because of misconduct, fails to complete
the period of active duty specified in the agreement. . . such person will reimburse the United
States in an amount that bears the same ratio to the total cost of advanced education provided such
person.” 10 U.S.C. § 2005(a)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
273. Hensala v. Dep’t of the Air Force (Hensala II), 343 F.3d 951, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2003).
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permitted Captain Hensala’s same-sex partner to live on base with him on
the condition that they did not “publicize” their relationship.274
However, two years later the Air Force sought to separate Hensala
from the armed services and ordered recoupment of $71,429.53 in
educational expenses paid by the government.275 The District Court for the
Northern District of California affirmed the recoupment order and declined
to determine whether Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was constitutional in light of
pre-Lawrence precedence.276 However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit cast serious doubt as to the continuing constitutionality of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.
Captain Hensala asserted that the recoupment policy under Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell was violative of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).277
Federal courts are granted authority under the APA to set aside agency
decisions where they are either “arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in
accordance with law,”278 or “contrary to constitutional right.”279 In addition
to claiming that his due process and equal protection rights had been
violated, Captain Hensala asserted that the recoupment policy violated his
rights under the First Amendment.280 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
district court was correct in dismissing the claim that the Air Force was
arbitrary and capricious in ordering the recoupment of educational
expenses.281

274. Id. at 954.
275. Id. at 955. An investigation was conducted into the background of Captain Hensala. Id.
at 954. In 1994 Deputy Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch issued a memorandum outlining the
circumstances in which recoupment of educational expenses is proper. Id. at 954-55. The
memorandum stated that
[A] member’s statement that he or she is a homosexual, though grounds for separation
under the current policy if it demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts, does not constitute a basis for recoupment, as defined above. This
does not preclude recoupment, however, if the member making such a statement has
otherwise failed to complete his or her term of service “voluntarily or because of
misconduct.” In particular, recoupment would be appropriate where, based on the
circumstances, it is determined that the member made the statement for the purpose of
seeking separation.
Id. at 958.
276. Hensala I, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 997, 1004. The Ninth Circuit upheld Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell in Holmes v. California Army National Guard. See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124
F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell regulates only conduct and
does not impose a burden on speech under the First Amendment).
277. Hensala II, 343 U.S. F.3d at 955.
278. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
279. Id. § 706(2)(B).
280. Hensala II, 343 F.3d at 955.
281. Id. at 956. The Ninth Circuit examined the statistics of recoupment orders pursuant to
discharges commanded under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Id. at 955. The Air Force ordered recoupment of expenses in twenty-three of twenty-eight similar cases. Id. Moreover, where discharge
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The Ninth Circuit noted that unlike Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, the recoupment policy did not provide a rebuttable presumption of impermissible
sexual conduct.282 Because the recoupment policy effectively targeted
homosexual service members based on status rather than conduct, the court
declined to follow its previous precedence upholding Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.283 The recoupment policy did not create a rebuttable presumption of
misconduct, but rather targeted only those service members who identified
themselves as homosexuals without inquiry into whether there had been an
instance of misconduct.284 Furthermore, the recoupment policy did not
apply to heterosexual service members as the court had previously attempted to explain.285 The recoupment policy targeted only the declaration of
one’s homosexuality rather than the propensity to engage in homosexual
conduct.286 As such, the court held that the issue of whether the Air Force
was directing policy toward only gay and lesbian service members presented a colorable issue on remand in light of the First Amendment
implications of Lawrence.287
The present state of litigation challenging Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is still
largely confined to the traditional bases of equal protection and due process.288 Moreover, First Amendment challenges to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell to

was not based on a service member’s statement of sexual orientation, recoupment was ordered 274
times in 277 cases. Id.
282. Id. at 958.
283. Id. See Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1135 (upholding Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell on due process, equal protection, and First Amendment grounds). The Holmes court
stated that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was not violative of the Equal Protection Clause because of the
military’s legitimate interest in separating service members because of “homosexual conduct.” Id.
at 1134 (emphasis added). The court further noted that the policy was rationally related to a
legitimate government interest because the presumption that a statement indicating a service
member who identifies themselves as homosexual will not be celibate is rebuttable, and is
applicable to both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Id. at 1136. Lastly, Holmes held that the First
Amendment was not implicated because statements of sexual orientation were evidence of
conduct only. Id.
284. Hensala II, 343 F.3d at 957-58.
285. Id. at 958; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136. See Karst, supra note 116, at 278 (“Defense
Department strongly indicated that discharge would result only where homosexual conduct was
indicated, and not because of a service member’s homosexual status.”).
286. Hensala II, 343 F.3d at 958.
287. Id.
288. See Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144-45 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(holding that rational basis review was applicable because “homosexuals do not constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class” and that “Lawrence v. Texas did not change constitutional
jurisprudence in a way that impacts the validity of [Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell]”); Cook v. Rumsfeld,
429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (D. Mass. 2006) (“Lawrence nor any other relevant precedent requires
treating the plaintiffs’ articulated liberty interest as a ‘fundamental’ interest calling for heightened
scrutiny in judicial review of the legislative decision-making.”); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed.
Cl. 503, 520 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (“[Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell] does not implicate a fundamental right and
thus will be reviewed under the rational basis standard for substantive due process purposes.”).

2008]

SEXUAL IDENTITY AS PERSONHOOD

217

date have not taken into account Lawrence’s protection of identity.289
Neither course of litigation has successfully overcome judicial deference to
military policy. To do so requires more than applying Lawrence to a
Bowers jurisprudential paradigm. Rather, it requires considering identity as
a fundamental right under the purview of the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The full implications of Lawrence for gay rights litigation are still
unknown. The Supreme Court’s opinion may yield different litigation
avenues previously unexplored. The judicial protection of gay identity
affords plaintiffs an avenue by which they may challenge burdens on such
identity, such as Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. However, the dispositive question
seems to be whether courts will overcome their post-Vietnam deference to
defend a First Amendment right. Thus far, judicial deference to military
and congressional policy regarding homosexual soldiers has proved
insurmountable in both pre- and post-Lawrence constitutional challenges.290
The district courts in Cook and Witt, for instance, failed to apply the
substance of Lawrence to the military context, as did the Court of Federal
Claims in Loomis.291 Future challenges to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell may be
able to rectify this misreading by asserting that the First Amendment, postLawrence, forbids burdening the formation and expression of sexual
identity in any context.
Indeed, Lawrence fundamentally altered protection afforded to gays
and lesbians, and affords potential plaintiffs the prospect of successfully
challenging discriminatory legislation including Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.
The decision itself endorses the idea that the Constitution protects gay
identity in addition to homosexual intimacy. In essence, the Supreme Court
stated that it is no longer permissible to require gays and lesbians to “live
within a lie.”292 The liberty interest articulated extends not only to

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded only the district court’s due process
holdings. Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, No. 06-35644, slip op. At 5868 (9th Cir. May 21,
2008). The court concluded that “Lawrence applied something more than traditional rational basis
review.” Id. at 5861. The Ninth Circuit did not, however, address the district court’s First
Amendment analysis or the First Amendment implications of Lawrence. Id.
289. See, e.g., Witt, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47 (holding that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell does not
violate the First Amendment); Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08 (noting that because Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell targets conduct, “‘a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms’” (quoting
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968))).
290. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir. 1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
686-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 263-66 (D. Md. 1995).
291. See supra notes 215-232, 237-272 and accompanying text.
292. HAVEL, supra note 1, at 144.
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interpersonal intimate relationships but also toward the world at large.
Thus, emerging from Lawrence is a First Amendment protection of identity
expression. This strikes the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy at its core; the
requirement of suppressing identity expression while permitting identity
associations may now prove untenable, and may subject the policy to higher
judicial scrutiny. Litigating identity expression in the military context may
bear the fruits of years of hard work and sacrifice by homosexual advocates
and their allies. It may also prove a crucial step toward true equality for
civilians and soldiers alike.

